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ment over the application of the defense to particular circumstances.
In rejecting legal impossibility if the consummation of the crime
is impossible because of some rule of law, the Model Penal Code
furnishes predictability and ease of administration and circumscribes
judicial discretion in interpreting fact situations. However, these
advantages are outweighed by countervailing policies. The Code will
cause an adopting jurisdiction to shirk its responsibility to evaluate
thoroughly the criminality of a course of conduct because it makes
all conduct punishable once evil intent is manifested. It is the duty of
the courts to do justice; that duty should not be avoided merely
because the concepts are complex and confusing. When the con-
summation of an intended crime is legally impossible, the defense of
legal impossibility should not be discarded. It is far from strange to
view the criminality of an attempt in relation to the completed
offense. Therefore, if an attempt occurs under circumstances that
would not make the intended result a crime, the attempt should not
be criminal.
Hellmut A. Erwing
Master-Servant - Abolition of Assumption of Risk
as a Defense
Plaintiff, while working at a wash basin during her regular em-
ployment as a nurse's aid, was injured when a patient in a wheel-
chair pushed a door inward and caused a metal hook on the inside
of the door to strike her in the upper portion of her back. The hook
enabled patients and hospital personnel to open the door from the
inside with a forearm. The evidence showed that the architect who
designed the room knew that the door came in contact with the
wash basin when fully opened, and consequently, he placed a rubber
knob on the hook to absorb the forceful contact. Plaintiff contended
that her employer, the hospital, was negligent in failing to provide
a reasonably safe place to work. The hospital defended affirmatively
on the basis of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The
trial court upheld the assumption of risk plea and did not make a
finding on the contributory negligence defense. Held,1 reversed and
remanded: In a common-law action brought by an employee, the
'The hospital-nurse employment relationship is not covered by the Washington Work-
men's Compensation Act. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 51.12.010 (employments included),
§ 51.12.020 (employments excluded), and § 51.12.030 (test for unenumerated occupations)
(1962).




defense of assumption of risk is not available to a negligent employer.
A servant injured during employment because of a dangerous condi-
tion negligently created or maintained by his master is not precluded
from recovery merely because he is aware or should know of the
dangerous condition. However, if the employee's voluntary exposure
to the risk is unreasonable under the circumstances, he is barred from
recovery because of contributory negligence. Siragusa v. Swedish
Hospital, - Wash. 2d -, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
The doctrine of assumption of risk in master-servant relationships'
finds its source in Priestly v. Fowler,4 in which the English court re-
fused to hold an employer liable to an employee injured while on
the job. The court reasoned that if the overhead of inevitable indus-
trial injuries were placed on the employer, the expansion of industry
would be seriously impeded. Such a theory is practically antithetical
to modern treatment of the doctrine.' The change in judicial attitude
is primarily a consequence of two types of legislation: (1) state
workmen's compensation acts,' which cover nearly all industrial
accidents, and (2) the Federal Employer's Liability Act' and the
Jones Act,' which encompass the two largest groups not covered by
state workmen's compensation statutes-railroad employees engaged
in interstate commerce and seamen. In the comparatively few em-
'This Note is concerned with the doctrine of assumption of risk only as it relates to
master-servant relationships. The general doctrine, according to Professor James, covers
the following two types of situations:
(1) In its primary sense the plaintiff's assumption of a risk is only the
counterpart of the defendant's lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from that
risk. In such a case plaintiff may not recover for his injury even though he
was quite reasonable in encountering the risk that caused it. VolenhI non fit
injuria.
(2) A plaintiff may also be said to assume a risk created by defendant's breach
of duty towards him, when he deliberately chooses to encounter that risk.
In such a case, except possibly in master and servant cases, plaintiff will be
barred from recovery only if he was unreasonable in encountering the risk
under the circumstances. Harper & James, Torts § 21.1, at 1162 (1956).
43 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837).
'See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943), for a history of the de-
velopment of the doctrine.
'Prosser, Torts § 69 (2d ed. 1955):
The theory underlying the workmen's compensation acts never has been stated
better than in the old campaign slogan, "the cost of the product should bear
the blood of the workman." The accident losses of modern industry are to
be treated as a cost of production, like the breakage of tools or machinery.
The financial burden is lifted from the shoulders of the employee and placed
upon the employer, who is expected to add it to his costs, and so transfer it
to the consumer. In this he is aided and controlled by a system of compulsory
liability insurance, which equalizes the burden over the entire industry.
Through such insurance both the master and the servant are protected at
the expense of the ultimate consumer. Id. at 383.
7 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. 5 54 (1958).
841 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 5 688 (1958).
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ployer-employee areas in which legislatures have not abolished as-
sumption of risk, the doctrine has generally been applied in two
instances: (1) assumption of "ordinary or incidental risks" of em-
ployment, against which the master is not bound to protect and
(2) assumption of "extraordinary risks," i.e., those created by the
negligence of the master."
Ordinary risks of employment have been defined as "those risks
which remain after the master has used all reasonable care to remove
them and do not include any risk or hazard due to the master's
negligence."1 It is presumed that in the employment contract, the
servant's wages are fixed in contemplation of the fact that he has
assumed the risks incidental to the work to be performed." How-
ever, the proper analysis of liability for injuries resulting from or-
dinary dangers of the employment is that the employer is under no
obligation to protect his employee from the dangers that he cannot
alleviate by the use of reasonable care. Assumption of the ordinary
risk is not truly an affirmative defense. The employee is not allowed
to recover simply because the employer is not negligent. Nevertheless,
the majority of the courts have repeatedly utilized the label "assump-
tion of risk" when analyzing the ordinary risks of employment be-
cause of the phrase's "felicity.""5 The result is indiscriminate confu-
sion with the concept of assumption of extraordinary risks. 3 The
latter necessarily involves an employer's breach of a primary duty '
9 James, Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J. 141, 155-56 n.84 (1952). Prof. James in-
dicates that when the risk is incidental to the employment, the servant must plead and
prove that he did not assume it; whereas, assumption of an extraordinary risk is an affirma-
tive defense and casts the burden of proof upon the master-defendant.
t°James, supra note 9, at 156. Another definition of ordinary risks has been stated
as follows: "The usual and ordinary dangers incident to the service are assumed by the
contract of hiring. One entering into an employment which is necessarily more or less
dangerous is held to take those dangers into consideration in making his contract to work,
and for an injury received from such dangers the servant cannot recover." Ross v. Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry., 243 Ill. 440, 90 N.E. 701, 703 (1909).
But see Bassett v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 235 F.2d 900 (3d Cir. 1956); Holliday
v. Fulton Band Mill, 142 F.2d 1006 (th Cir. 1944); Moore v. Morse Malloy Shoe, 89
N.H. 332, 197 Atl. 707 (1938), in which the employer's liability was not based on the
breach of a primary duty, but rather on his failure to warn the employee of a latent defect
not discoverable by due diligence. See also Annot., 28 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1215, 1219 (1910).
"'Wichita Falls & S.R.R. v. Lindley, 143 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error
dism., pudgm. cor.; commented on by McGregor, Incurred Risk in Texas, 1 Baylor L. Rev.
410, 412 (1948).
12 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
318 U.S. 54 (1943).
" Two noted jurists have concluded that the doctrine of assumption of either kind of
risk adds nothing to the law but confusion. They advocate that the doctrine could be cov-
ered by three existing principles: (1) lack of duty on employer's part, (2) consent by
employee, and (3) contributory negligence by employee. James, op. cit. supra note 9, at 141;
Salmond, Torts 40 (1936).
"4Lawler states that the employer owes his employee the duty (1) to provide safe
machinery, (2) to provide a safe place in which to work, (3) to employ careful and
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to his empfoyee. This constitutes prima facie evidence of a negligent
act. 5 However, a majority of jurisdictions hold that such liability
is dissolved by a showing that the employee, with either actual or
constructive knowledge"6 of the danger and an appreciation' thereof,
voluntarily s entered into or continued in the employment without
complaint and without any promise on the part of the employer to
remedy that danger. 9 In these jurisdictions, assumption of the ex-
traordinary risks is a true affirmative defense.
The courts have been unable to settle upon a common basis for
applying the doctrine of assumption of risk when a servant know-
ingly and voluntarily encounters a danger created by the master's
competent co-employees, and (4) to provide rules and regulations and to warn inexperi-
enced servants of non-apparent hazards. Lawler, Texas Workmen's Compensation Laws 2-4
(1938).
"Ibid.
l "Knowledge and appreciation of the danger is an essential of the defense of assumption
of risk and, hence, the doctrine does not apply unless the one alleged to have assumed the
risk can be found to have known or to have been charged with knowledge of the danger."
S. H. Kress & Co. v. Maddox, 201 Okla. 190, 203 P.2d 706, 709 (1949); Missouri-Kansas-
Texas R.R. v. Barnaby, 167 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.o.m.
"Actual" knowledge presents no difficulty, provided it can be proven. However, in de-
termining whether the employee should be charged with "constructive" knowledge of the
defects, it is necessary to consider several factors, among which are the following: (1) the
reasonableness in determining the danger; (2) the patent, as opposed to the latent, nature
of the defect; (3) the environment of the plant or place of employment; (4) the ability
of the employer to foresee and to prevent the injury; (5) the relative ability of each to
foresee the harm; (6) the availability of the employees to rely on the employer to take
precautions in order to prevent employment injuries; and (7) the respective duty of each
to observe, investigate, and/or inspect.
" "There is involved in the question of assumption of risk not only . . . knowledge,
but a reasonable opportunity to ascertain the nature of the risk, and also an appreciation
[thereof]." York v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 184 Wis. 110, 198 N.W. 377, 381 (1924);
Millen v. Pacific Bridge Co., 51 Ore. 538, 95 Pac. 196 (1908).
18 See Prosser, op. cit. supra note 6, § 55 at 3 11-13.
The difficulty in the administration of this principle [voluntary assumption]
arises from the fact that, not withstanding vigorous protests, if the plaintiff
proceeds to enter voluntarily into a situation which exposes him to the risk
it will normally indicate that he does not stand on his objection, and has con-
sented, however reluctantly, to accept the risk and look out for himself.
Id. at 312.
Most American courts have refused to recognize the economic pressure placed on the
worker in employment situations. Often it is necessary that the workman choose between
his job and employment under dangerous circumstances. Ibid.
'"Huestis v. Lapham's Estate, 113 Vt. 191, 32 A.2d 115 (1943); Hansen v. City of
Minneapolis, 261 Minn. 568, 113 N.W.2d 508 (1962). By definition, assumption of the
extraordinary risks involves an act of negligence by the employer. However, many courts
have stated that a servant never assumes the risk of dangers created by the master's negli-
gence. See, e.g., Herrin Motor Lines v. Jarvis, 156 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1946); Yates v.
Atlantic Ice & Coal Co., 76 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1935). For a list of state citations see 56
C.J.S. Master & Servant § 362 n.62 (1948). Most of these cases can be distinguished by
the surrounding circumstances, e.g., the servant did not know of the danger; the master
assured the servant that there was no danger; the servant acted under the master's orders.
See Annot., 28 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1226-27, 1231 (1910). It is submitted, therefore, that the
above quoted phrase should be modified accordingly: A servant may not assume the risk
of dangers created by the master's negligence, unless knowing and appreciating the danger,
he (the servant) enters into or continues in the employment.
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negligence. Three theories have been advanced: (1) the implied con-
tractual basis whereby the employee assumes any dangers of which
he has knowledge," (2) volenti non fit injuria-"he who consents
to an act will not be heard to claim that he is wronged by it,"" and
(3) a servant who remains in the service of his master after acquiring
knowledge of the defect is said to waive all claims for injuries re-
sulting therefrom."
An increasing minority severly questions the defense of assump-
tion of extraordinary risks. The so-called "Missouri rule"" has, in
effect, abolished the doctrine of assumption of risk as an affirmative
defense although preserving it as a label for the ordinary dangers of
employment. Stated differently, a servant may "assume" the inci-
dental risks which remain after the master has exercised ordinary
care." However, "the moment negligence comes in the door . . . the
doctrine of assumption of the risk goes out at the window."" Many
Missouri courts have justified this treatment on the rationale of
public policy:
A servant neither by express nor implied contract is permitted to
waive the right he has to the protection afforded by the exercise of
reasonable care on the part of the master. Society has an interest to
serve in the preservation of the lives, limbs and health of its individuals
and an enlightened public policy will not tolerate the idea that a man
may contract away a right so sacred and thus voluntarily offer his body
as a sacrifice to positive wrong. Assumption of risk, being essentially
contractual, disappears from view when we find that negligence is the
producing cause of the injury and such cases cannot involve as elemental
20Britton v. Central Union Telephone Co., 131 Fed. 844 (6th Cir. 1904); Parker v.
City of Wichita, 150 Kan. 249, 92 P.2d 86 (1939).
21 Osterholm v. Boston & Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Mining Co., 40 Mont.
508, 107 Pac. 499 (1910); Kansas City So. Ry. v. Diggs, 205 Ark. 150, 167 S.W.2d 879
(1943); Schiano v. McCarthy Freight Sys., 75 R.I. 253, 65 A.2d 462 (1949).
'aIllinois Cent. R.R. v. Fitzpatrick, 227 Il. 118, 81 N.E. 529 (1907); 2 Cooley,
Torts 1046 (3d ed. 1906).
Ordinarily, it is immaterial whether assumption of risk is founded upon implied contract,
volenti non fit injuria, or waiver, since all three are based upon the knowledge of the
servant. However, it has been argued that if the master breaches a statutory duty and the
doctrine is rooted in contract, public policy will prevent the employee from waiving per-
formance of an obligation imposed on the employer for the former's benefit. On the other
hand, if the doctrine is based upon the maxim of volenti non fit injuria, it will be applica-
ble to breaches of both statutory and nonstatutory duties. Annot., 28 L.R.A. (n.s.)
1215, 1228-1231.
"Goodwin v.. Missouri Pac. Ry., 335 Mo. 398, 72 S.W.2d 988 (1934); Hines v.
Continental Banking Co., 334 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1960). The same result has been reached
in North Carolina, Florida, Wisconsin, and Mississippi. See notes 31-36 infra.
4 In Goodwin v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 335 Mo. 398, 72 S.W.2d 988, 991 (1934), the
Missouri court stated that the rule (as to assumption of the ordinary risks) presupposes
that the employer has performed the duty of caution, care, and vigilance which the law
casts upon him and, by definition, that he is free from negligence. See also Spencer v.
Veadle S.S. Co., 4 Cal. 2d 313, 48 P.2d 678 (1935), aff'd, 298 U.S. 124 (1936).
"Markley v. Kansas City So. Ry., 338 Mo. 436, 90 S.W.2d 409 (1936).
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other issues than those concerned with the negligence of the master and
the contributory negligence of the servant."
Under the Missouri approach, the only defense available to the
employer is contributory negligence." It becomes necessary, then,
to distinguish contributory negligence from the defense of assump-
tion of extraordinary risks. The two are closely associated; the dis-
tinction between them is a matter of degree rather than kind. Often
the same facts will support both defenses. 8 However, of necessity,
contributory negligence always involves some fault of the servant;
whereas, assumption of the extraordinary risk precludes recovery by
the servant even though he has exercised more than an ordinary degree
of care in encountering the situation created by the master's
negligence."
North Carolina courts have applied a different theory that, never-
theless, arrives at the same result as that reached by the Missouri
judiciary. In Hicks v. Naomi Falls Mfg. Co.,"° the North Carolina
court stated that if the employer's negligence is the proximate cause
of an injury to his employee, the latter shall not be precluded from
recovery merely because he might have been aware of the increased
danger. The employee is barred only if the danger is so great that
his conduct, in effect, amounts to contributory negligence. Thus,
North Carolina has eliminated assumption of risk as a defense in
those areas in which the employee is injured while reasonably pro-
ceeding with actual or constructive awareness of the employer's
negligently created or maintained defect. Nevertheless, the doctrine
is nominally preserved as a defense if the employee is unreasonable in
"Mack v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 123 Mo. App. 531, 101 S.W. 142 (1907). There ap-
pears to be two major problems with the rationale: (1) The doctrine of assumption of risk
has other bases besides contract, viz., volenti non fit injuria and waiver. (2) In contracts
where the servant expressly assumes the risk of his employment, the defense will be upheld.
See James, op. cit. supra note 9, at 162-66.
" Contributory negligence is the only defense available where the servant is injured by
a peril created by the master's negligence. Fish v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 263 Mo. 106,
172 S.W. 340 (1914).
2 "The point where the two concepts approximate is where the danger is so obvious
and imminent that no one of ordinary prudence would encounter it." Stogner v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 184 S.C. 406, 192 S.E. 406, 408 (1937).
"' Schneider v. Texas Co., 244 Minn. 131, 69 N.W.2d 329 (1955); Meistrich v. Casino,
31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959). See also James, op. cit. supra note 9, at 141; Annot.,
82 A.L.R.2d 1221, 1226-27 (1962); cf. Alexander, Rethinking Negligence, 11 Miss. L.J.
290 (1939). An important reason for the distinction is that some statutes have recognized
one defense, but abolished the other; e.g., Minneapolis, St. P. & St. Ste. M.R.R. v. Popular,
237 U.S. 369 (1914), construed the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531 (1893),
45 U.S.C. § 1 (1954), "not [to] preclude the defense of contributory negligence, as dis-
tinguished from that of assumption of risk." Secondly, those jurisdictions adhering to the
"Missouri rule" acknowledge only contributory negligence and refuse to apply assumption
of extraordinary risks. See notes 23, 24 supra and notes 30-35 infra.
a0 138 N.C. 319, 50 S.E. 703 (1905).
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encountering the dangerous condition (the same area covered by con-
tributory negligence under the "Missouri rule")."
An interesting treatment of the defense is afforded in Wisconsin.
Assumption of risk as a defense is abolished by statute in all master-
servant situations except farm labor.' However, the recent case of
Colson v. Rule" set forth several reasons for the abolition of the
defense even with respect to farm labor. (1) It is unrealistic to hold
that a farm laborer can assume the risk of defective tools furnished
by an employer because the doctrine requires "freedom of choice,"
and a refusal to make use of the tools would likely result in dis-
charge. (2) "It tends to immunize those employers from liability
who are the greatest transgressors in providing safe conditions of
work for their employees.""' (3) There is no moral justification for
barring an employee from recovery "in negligence against his em-
ployer because of any act on the employee's part which an ordinarily
careful and prudent man similarly situated would have performed.""
The Washington Supreme Court, in the principal case, remanded
to the trial court the factual questions of the employer's negligence
and the nurse's contributory negligence. In summarily subtracting
from consideration the issue of assumption of the ordinary or in-
cidental dangers of employment, the court stated that the true
analysis is that the employer is under no duty to protect the employee
with regard to such risks, and any injuries, therefore, are not due
to the master's negligence." "Hence, the point of inquiry here is to
re-examine the rule which bars a servant's recovery for injuries due
" See text accompanying note 27 supra. Also see Maulden v. High Point Bending &
Chair Co., 196 N.C. 122, 144 S.E. 557 (1928); Pressly v. Dover Yarn Mills, 138 N.C. 410,
51 S.E. 69 (1905). Like Missouri and the majority, North Carolina has utilized the phrase
in cases of injuries resulting from incidental risks involved in employment.
"Wis. Stat. Ann. § 331.37(3) (1957).
"S5 Wis. 2d 387, 113 N.W.2d 21 (1962).
34 1d. at 22.
" Id. at 23. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also set out a fourth, and most persuasive,
argument, peculiar to comparative negligence jursidictions: under assumption of risk, the
employee is precluded from any recovery in situations in which his master is negligent and
he (employee) passively accepts a defective tool or unsafe condition of work. But according
to the comparative negligence statute, the employee can actively contribute to cause his
injury and still recover some damages against his negligent employer, provided the jury does
not attribute 50% or more of the combined negligence to the employee. See 17 Sw. L.J.
155 (1963).
See also: (1) Miss. Code Ann. § 1456 (1942), which, with a few exceptions, abolishes
assumption of risk in employer-employee relationships. Alexander, op. cit. supra note 29,
suggests that the statute operates to abolish no defense, for assumption of risk never existed
as a separate defense. (2) Ritter v. Beals, 225 Ore. 504, 358 P.2d 1080 (1961), noted
in 47 Va. L. Rev. 1444 (1961).
as It is submitted that, as espoused by the Washington court, the nomenclature of assump-
tion of risk should be eliminated in all cases in which an employee incurs injury from an in-
cidental danger of employment; and rather, these cases should be decided on their true
basis, the master's lack of duty.
[Vol. 17
to the master's negligence, although he was not acting unreasonably
[contributorily negligent] in exposing himself to a known dangerous
condition." '37 Under the rule in the majority of the states and under
previous Washington law, the plaintiff-nurse could only recover if
it were shown that she neither knew nor appreciated the danger of
the bare protruding hook.3" The court overruled the prior law and
indicated that the employee's knowledge and appreciation of the
risk of injury could be important factors in determining the ques-
tions of the employer's negligence in maintaining the dangerous con-
dition and the employee's contributory negligence in exposing her-
self to it. The nurse may now recover if the jury finds that (1) the
hospital negligently created or maintained the defective device and
(2) she is free of contributory negligence, i.e., she acted with
reasonable and prudent caution while cognizant and appreciative of
the danger."' It is submitted that the policy of the principal case is
salutary in refusing to immunize a defendant in situations in which
an innocent and reasonably cautious plaintiff is injured as a result
of the former's negligence.'
A fair criticism of the holding in the present case would of
necessity include a consideration of two problems. First, it has been
aptly stated that:
[I]n light of the obvious disenchantment of the judiciary with respect
to the troublesome doctrine of assumption of risk it would not seem
inappropriate to caution that any contemplated abolition of the defense
in its entirety in the master-servant sphere of litigation should be
resolved by legislative action, inasmuch as piece-meal judicial destruc-
tion of the doctrine . . . may only breed additional conceptual in-
security.4
'7 373 P.2d at 772.
"Such a showing would have been difficult in light of the purpose of the instrument
and the nurse's experience in the hospital.
" The Siragusa fact pattern conceivably could fall into one of five categories:
(1) The injury was a result of an incidental risk connected with employment; the
employer is free from negligence.
(2) The employer was negligent; employee neither knew nor appreciated the danger.
Injury resulted.
(3) The employer was negligent; employee knew of the defect, but was (reasonably)
unappreciative. Injury resulted.
(4) The employer was negligent; employee knew and appreciated the danger; employee
was reasonable in proceeding in the face of said defect. Injury resulted.
(5) The employer was negligent; employee knew and appreciated the danger, but was
unreasonable in encountering same. Injury resulted.
Under the majority rule, the plaintiff would be entitled to recovery only in (2) and (3)
above. However, the law as stated in the present case allows the plaintiff to recover in
(4) as well.
' See Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 La. L. Rev. 108, 120-21
(1961). See also text accompanying note 53 infra.
"' Note, 47 Va. L. Rev. at 1430.
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However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently overcame this ob-
jection: "The doctrine of assumption of risk as an absolute defense
in master-servant cases was judge made. Therefore, if the legislature
has refrained from acting on the subject, the courts could properly
abolish or modify the doctrine."4 The Washington court in the
instant case evidently did not consider the issue to be a stumbling
block since no mention of it was made. Secondly, the Washington
court admitted that the traditional defense of assumption of extra-
ordinary risks reduces the employer's duty of furnishing a reason-
ably safe place of employment to that of warning his employee of
unknown defects and dangers." Is such a substitution justified? "The
duty of warning and instruction is entirely distinct from and in-
dependent of the duty of furnishing reasonably safe premises and
appliances."" The employer must shoulder the responsibility of per-
forming both. To preclude liability on the basis of an employee's
knowledge and appreciation of the danger would, in effect, relieve
the employer of the most important of the two duties. In a rather
complete description of the master's duty to provide a reasonably
safe place of employment, Judge Julian P. Alexander states:
The master, of course, owes his servant the duty to use reasonable
care to provide tools, appliances and places of work which are reasonably
safe. This duty is more completely stated, however, when it involves
the reciprocal duty of the servant to use reasonable prudence with
respect to the place, appliances, tools, and other conditions of his
employment."
4 Colson v. Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387, 113 N.W.2d 21 (1962).
43 373 P.2d at 772, 773.
44Gains v. Johnson, 133 Ky. 507, 105 S.W. 381 (1907).
4 Alexander, op. cit. supra note 29, at 290. For coverage and exclusion of employees
under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, see Commentary, 22 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. xxvi (1956).
Where assumption of risk with respect to the master-servant area is not covered by
statute, the Texas courts have, in effect, followed the majority. However, at least in its
technical sense, the doctrine has been limited solely to contractual relationships "too
long, too often, and too lately . . . to permit of re-examination at this time." Schiller v.
Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607, 610 (1952).
In noncontractual relationships where the plaintiff encountered a known and appreciated
danger, the doctrine volenti non fit injuria has been the basic theory on which the courts
have barred the plaintiff's recovery. "The only difference suggested by the courts in the
defense of volenti non fit injuria and that of assumption of risk is that the latter doctrine
applies to cases arising from the relationship of master and servant, or at least to cases
involving a contractual relationship, whereas the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria applies
in proper cases independently of any contractual relationship." Cummins v. Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Co., 319 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
The scope of assumption of risk in Texas has been succinctly stated in Carter v. Kansas
City So. Ry., 155 S.W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
The doctrine of assumed risk, as known at common law, is predicated upon
an agreement, express or implied, by which the employe voluntarily exposes
himself to the hazards which he encounters in the performance of his duties.
The perils which he assumes are those ordinarily incident to his employment,
[Vol. 17
This may be interpreted to imply that whenever the employee acts
reasonably, the employer cannot substitute a bare warning of danger
for his duty to provide the employee with a reasonably safe place
to work.
Those jurisdictions adhering to the holding in the Siragusa case"
have, in effect, eliminated from all common law master-servant re-
lationships assumption of risk as a defense to the master's negligence."
If a defect or danger exists because of the master's negligence, a
servant may cautiously encounter the danger, though known and
appreciated by him, without barring recovery should he suffer injury
as a result." The servant, however, does not have a license to act in a
flagrantly irresponsible manner in such situations since contributory
negligence on the employee's part is a complete defense. Further, the
employee's knowledge and appreciation of the danger are, in those
jurisdictions,6 factors to be considered in determining negligence by
the employer or contributory negligence by the employee."0
The policy behind the elimination of the defense of assumption of
extraordinary risk appears sound from two standpoints. (1) "The
best usage for a defensive theory is the one 'that most sharply focuses
the defensive facts. Assumed risk is usually too blunt and too com-
prehensive to serve such a function in a highly developed adversary
process.. .... A majority of the courts have seized upon assumption of
risk because its rhetorical "felicity" provides an opportunity for
treating certain cases on a single issue without the necessity of con-
sidering other, more difficult issues. Furthermore, certain policy prob-
lems are inadequately presented because the defense often overlaps
and duplicates certain other doctrines."' (2) The master will not be
liable if he is reasonably unaware that his conduct has resulted in a
risk of harm. The creation of the risk must be unreasonable for the
employer to be liable. In theory, then, if the master is held responsible
and such as are normally to be expected from the particular character of
the service in which the employe is engaged. The rule also includes those
dangers arising from the failure of the employer to perform his duty in pro-
viding safe tools and appliances and safe places for work, of which the em-
ploye knows, or by the exercise of ordinary circumspection in the performance
of his labors would know. Assumed risk is founded upon the knowledge of
employe, either actual or constructive, of the hazards to be encountered,
and his consent to take the chance of injury therefrom. Id. at 643.
4See notes 23, 30, 32, 35 supra.
" These jurisdictions still preclude recovery where the employee incurs injury from an
incidental danger connected with the employment.
48 Se note 39 supra.
49 See note 46 supra.
0 373 P.2d at 773.
51 Keeton, op. cit. supra note 40, at 120-21.
5' Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 La. L. Rev.
5 (1961).
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